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Online Appendices (Not for Publication)
A A Model of the Information Environment and Ag-
gregation
Here we present a simple model of learning based on the Dirichlet sampling process to char-
acterize how information aggregation might arise in a pari-mutuel-style mechanism similar
to our IAM. Recall that we partition the set of feasible sales into a set of K ranges or
“buckets,” denoted by x1, . . . , xK . Without loss of generality beyond this discretization, we
can characterize the probability that realized sales fall into a given bucket with a K-point
multinomial distribution:
Y |pi ∈

x1, with prob. pi1
x2, with prob. pi2
· · · · · ·
xK , with prob. piK
(A.1)
In this environment, agents are endeavoring to learn about the entire distribution of sales,
as described by the set of unknown parameters pi = (pi1, . . . , piK)
′. The fact that agents
must learn about an entire probability distribution distinguishes this learning environment
from typical univariate learning models in economics. In this environment, agents’ evolving
beliefs about the unknown probabilities pi corresponds to a “distribution over distributions,”
a modeling environment for which the Dirichlet is particularly well-adapted.
Suppose agents start off with a (common) prior that pi follows a Dirichlet distribution with
non-negative concentration parameters α = (α1, . . . , αK)
′, supported on the K-dimensional
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unit simplex. The prior distribution and expectation for the cell probabilities are denoted:
pi ∼ Dir (α1, . . . , αK) , E [pik] = αk∑K
j=1 αj
(A.2)
Each agent updates her beliefs about pi upon observing signals about the likelihood of dif-
ferent states. Specifically, an agent observes mn signals sn,1, . . . , sn,mn , drawn independently
from a multinomial distribution MN(pi). From these mn signals, the agent can compute sam-
ple frequencies pˆn,1, . . . , pˆn,K , where pˆn,k =
1
mn
∑mn
j=1 1 {sn,j = k}, the sample frequency with
which the signal falls into the k-th bucket. Given these conjugate distributional assumptions,
the posterior distribution for pi conditional on these signals will also be Dirichlet:
pi|sn, α ∼ Dir (α1 +mnpˆn,1, . . . , αK +mnpˆn,K) (A.3)
E [pik|sn, α] = αk +mnpˆn,k
mn +
∑K
j=1 αj
≡ p˜n,k
In this setting, we want to characterize precisely what information aggregation means in
terms of the underlying distribution of sales Y based on all agents’ information. Adding the
simplifying assumption that the signals are independent across agents, let M =
∑N
n=1mn
denote the total number of signals and pˆk =
1
M
∑N
n=1
∑mn
j=1 1 {sn,j = k} be the proportion
of all signals in bucket k. By conjugacy, the aggregated posterior distribution across all N
agents will again be Dirichlet:
pi|s1, . . . , sN , α ∼ Dir
(
α1 +
N∑
n=1
mnpˆ1,n, . . . , αK +
N∑
n=1
mnpˆK,n
)
(A.4)
E [pik|s1, . . . , sN , α] = αk +
∑N
n=1mnpˆn,k
M +
∑K
j=1 αj
≡ p˜k
This last posterior distribution, p (pi|s1, . . . , sN , α), represents the fully aggregated informa-
tion regarding the distribution of the outcome variable Y available to participants. Intu-
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itively, each individual’s draws from the multinomial distribution correspond to mn “bits”
of information about the true distribution for Y and the Dirichlet distribution provides a
convenient summary of the total information revealed to individuals.
Note that the posterior beliefs still allow for aggregate uncertainty in the cell probabilities
themselves to persist in the populations’ information set. That is, while the expected cell
probabilities are fixed, the realized cell probabilities remain random with a positive variance.
Nonetheless, these expected cell probabilities represent all the information available about
the uncertainty in how realized sales will turn out as opposed to a principle that rests on
the possibility that no uncertainty exists. This allows us to define “successful” information
aggregation in the mechanism in expectation as:
Definition 1 (Information Aggregation in Expectation). We say the IAM aggregates infor-
mation in expectation if the expected cell probabilities are proportional to the allocation of
tickets within the IAM.
Given a large number of independent signals, so that M →∞, either because each agent
receives a lot of information (mn becomes large) or many agents receive information (N
becomes large), the law of large numbers ensures that full-information posteriors converge
to the true probabilities:
p˜k =
αk +
∑N
n=1mnpˆn,k
M +
∑K
j=1 αj
→ pik, k = 1, . . . , K. (A.5)
This allows us to define what “exactly successful” information aggregation means as:
Definition 2 (Exact Information Aggregation). We say the IAM aggregates information
exactly if the true unobserved cell probabilities, conditional on available information, are
proportional to the allocation of tickets within the IAM.
These two definitions contrast the aggregate uncertainty in outcomes, characterized by
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the cell probabilities pi, and the aggregate uncertainty in the distribution over outcomes,
characterized by the Dirichlet posterior distribution. Clearly, as these definitions do not
explicitly rely on the Dirichlet structure, they can be readily interpreted as applying to any
measurable setting.
A.1 Incentives for Information Revelation
Given our definitions above, we now examine how incentives might guide individual behavior
to reveal their posterior beliefs in the IAM. Suppose the IAM at time t is in a state where
each bucket xk has η
(t)
k tickets in it and denote the state vector of tickets across buckets by
η(t). Denote agent n’s interim posterior expected beliefs at time t, conditional on the IAM
state and history up to t, by p
(t)
n =
[
p
(t)
n,1, . . . , p
(t)
n,K
]′
. For a risk-neutral agent who has not
yet placed any tickets, the marginal value of placing an additional ticket in bucket xk is
simply their posterior expectation of the realized outcome falling in that bucket divided by
the number of tickets within the bucket:
V (t)n (xk| sn, η(t)) =
p
(t)
n,k
1 + η
(t)
k
In this case, the agent would maximize their payoff by placing their marginal ticket in
the bucket that has the highest “odds” – that is, the largest posterior likelihood pn,k relative
to the number of tickets that would be placed in the bucket (1 + η
(t)
k ). As this discussion
makes clear, an agent who places tickets strategically primarily cares not about what the
most likely outcome is, but rather the outcome for which the distribution implied by the
IAM state differs most from his interim posterior. The most likely outcome is only preferred
when a player’s beliefs are consistent with the consensus, so that p
(t)
n,k ∝ η(t)k , in which case
the player has a slight preference for placing tickets in the bucket with highest probability.
This preference slightly distorts incentives because of the finite number of tickets placed in
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the IAM, which results in agents evaluating incentives according to the number of tickets in
the bin “plus one.” This effect could induce a slight reverse-favorite longshot bias, but since
this distortion clearly becomes negligible as the number of tickets grows.
If agent n has already placed νn,k tickets in bucket xk, then the marginal expected payoff
from placing an additional ticket in this bucket is:
Vn (xk|νn, sn, η) = pn,k
(
1 + νn,k
1 + ηk
− νn,k
ηk
)
which may also be distorted by the player’s existing holdings, particularly if νn,k/ηk is large
(i.e., if player n has placed a large share of the tickets in bucket k). However, in markets
where information is spread diffusely across players, νn,k/ηk would be small and this distortion
becomes negligible.
Note that incentives in the IAM are structured so that participants gain nothing from
misrepresenting their beliefs. This feature presents an important element of the IAM’s
design that distinguishes it from continuous double auctions and facilitates its objective of
aggregating information. When players disagree about the likelihood of events, the placement
of tickets within the IAM ebbs and flows until a consensus forms. The IAM provides an
intuitive and accessible mechanism for participants to communicate their beliefs quickly and
efficiently. As long as two players disagree, they will be able to express that disagreement
by placing more tickets. As this dynamic highlights the disagreement, players update their
beliefs until they converge on a consensus distribution over states implied by the IAM.
Result 1 (Incentive Compatibility of Reporting Information in the IAM).
Incentives in the IAM encourage participants to place tickets in the bins for which they most
disagree with the probabilities implied by the distribution of tickets already placed within the
IAM.
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A.2 Information Aggregation as an Equilibrium Property
The incentives identified in the previous section indicate that subjects are encouraged to
place tickets in a manner that most expresses their disagreement with the state of the IAM.
We now consider how those incentives interact with the nature of equilibrium in the IAM.
Suppose all information in the system is publicly revealed, so that every participant in the
IAM agrees that the posterior distribution for pi is given by equation (A.4). Given a common
prior and common knowledge of rationality, the result from Aumnn (1976) stipulates this
sort of agreement would be a necessary feature for any equilibrium in the mechanism. This
property allows us to abstract from the complications induced by strategic communication
and the Folk theorem for dynamic settings, providing a clear and tractable perspective on
the possibility of informative equilibria in the IAM in settings with rational expectations.
In this environment, an obvious symmetric Nash equilbrium exists, namely one where in-
dividuals place their tickets proportionally to the jointly agreed upon posterior expected cell
probabilities, νn,k ∝ p˜k,∀n, k. In fact, this equilibrium is the unique symmetric, simultaneous
equilibrium in the IAM, which we establish in the next Proposition.
Proposition 1. [Information Aggregation as an Equilibrium Property]
• Suppose the information aggregation environment is characterized by the distributional
assumptions embedded in equations A.1 - A.5. Suppose further that all private signals
are publicly revealed, so that p˜n,k = p˜k = E [pik|s1, . . . , sn, α] ,∀n, k
• Suppose tickets are infinitely divisible and each player places their tickets proportionally
to the posterior expected cell probabilities, so that νn,k ∝ p˜k,∀n, k.
This behavioral strategy represents the unique symmetric equilibrium outcome with agree-
ment, under which the IAM aggregates information in expectation. Further, as information
accumulates and M →∞, then p˜k → pik and the IAM aggregates information exactly in this
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equilibrium.
The proof of this proposition is given at the end of this section. Proposition 1 indicates
that, if private information can be effectively communicated, the IAM’s incentives will lead
to information aggregation through equilibrium once agreement obtains. Further, the IAM
stabilizes in a state where it aggregates information, in the sense that players do not have an
incentive to disrupt the IAM. Since the conditions assumed here are essentially equivalent
to the definition of an ex-post equilibrium, the result should not be terribly surprising.
However, it highlights the simple link between rational expectations, the IAM’s incentives,
and information aggregation.
Result 2 (Symmetric Equilibrium with Agreement Supports Information Aggregation).
Information aggregation within the IAM can be supported as a unique, symmetric Nash
equilibrium.
The main challenge in establishing information aggregation as a necessary property of
equilibrium lies in the complexity of dynamic behavior and determining beliefs off the equi-
librium path. Given the dynamic nature of the IAM and the complexity of beliefs and
strategies, we’d expect a multiplicity of potentially exotic and asymmetric equilibria that
we could not hope to characterize completely. That said, the purpose of our analysis is not
to provide an exhaustive characterization of all equilibria in the IAM nor do we intend to
relate these equilibria to properties of mechanisms typically associated with prediction and
financial markets. Rather, our analysis is restricted to motivating the expectation that In-
tel’s experience in implementing the IAM can inform other complex organizations designing
systems to address information aggregation problems. To this end, though the equilibrium
analysis above is incomplete, we do establish the possibility of information aggregation and
characterize the incentives by which it presents a natural outcome of the IAM.
We conclude this section with a remark on the role of robust theoretical foundations
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for information aggregation in our application. The mechanism design literature has a rich
tradition of mechanisms in which information aggregates in the unique equilibrium satisfying
individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints. Despite the robustness of these
devices’ theoretical properties, their implementation in complex settings is constrained by
their complexity as well as their lack of familiarity to mechanism participants. More complex
mechanisms have yet to pass through the crucible of experimental validation by which the
rules and incentives of the IAM have been refined and, in so doing, these mechanisms will
almost certainly require practical refinements as a result. The pari-mutuel incentives and
dynamic elements of the IAM may complicate a complete characterization of its equilibria,
but they do present established institutions that facilitate participant interactions. This
feature is not exclusively a consequence of theoretical intuition, but relies critically on the
experimental foundations for the IAM’s design.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Part 1: Best Response Along Equilibrium Path
Given expected cell probabilities and other players’ ticket placements, it is optimal for a
player to place tickets according to the expected cell probabilities. This partial-equilibrium
result establishes that the above assumptions suffice for νn,k ∝ p˜k, ∀n, k, to be a best response.
Consider the decision problem faced by the n-th player, conditioning on the players’
beliefs p˜n, k = p˜k and the assumption that all other players are placing their tickets pro-
portionally to the aggregate posterior beliefs. Player n’s payoff from any ticket allocation
is:
E [un (ν) |s1, . . . , sN , α] =
K∑
k=1
νn,k
(N − 1) p˜k + νn,kE [pik|s1, . . . , sN , α] =
K∑
k=1
νn,k
(N − 1) p˜k + νn,k p˜k
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Taking first order conditions of the Lagrangian that incorporates a shadow cost (λ) for the
constraint that tickets be fully allocated:
∂
∂νn,k
E [un (ν) |s1, . . . , sN , α] = (N − 1) p˜
2
k
((N − 1) p˜k + νn,k)2
− λ = 0
K∑
k=1
νn,k = 1
The budget constraint enforces these first order conditions to balance across each of the K
cells, so player n’s utility maximizing strategy accords with the equilibrium prediction that
the players allocate tickets according to the posterior expected cell probabilities.
(N − 1) p˜2k
((N − 1) p˜k + νn,k)2
=
(N − 1) p˜2j
((N − 1) p˜j + νn,j)2
=⇒ νn,k
νn,j
=
p˜k
p˜j
Part 2: Uniqueness of Equilibrium Outcome
We now establish uniqueness of the equilibrium outcome. First, we show that at least one
player has a profitable deviation if the IAM’s distribution of tickets is not proportional to
the agreed-upon posterior odds. Second, we show that asymmetric ticket allocations are not
supportable with agreement.
(a) Suppose the IAM’s distribution of tickets is not proportional to p˜, then at least one
player has a profitable deviation.
Without loss of generality, suppose p˜1 > η1 and order the indices so that
p˜1
η1
≥ p˜2
η2
≥ · · · ≥
p˜K
ηK
. Choose as player 1 a subject that weakly underallocates tickets to bucket 1, so that
ν1,1 ≤ η1 < p˜1 and select bucket k so that ν1,k ≥ ηk. Consider the gains and losses to player
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1 from shifting  tickets from bucket k to bucket 1.
Gains from Increasing ν1,1:
(
ν1,1+
Nη1+
− ν1,1
Nη1
)
p˜1 =
Nη1−ν1,1
Nη1+
p˜1
η1

N
Cost of Decreasing ν1,k:
(
ν1,k−
Nηk− −
ν1,k
Nηk
)
p˜k =
Nηk−ν1,k
Nηk−
p˜k
ηk

N
We want to show that this deviation is profitable for some  > 0, for which it will be
sufficient to show:
Nη1 − ν1,1
Nη1
p˜1
η1
=
(
1− ν1,1
Nη1
)
p˜1
η1
>
(
1− ν1,k
Nηk
)
p˜k
ηk
=
Nηk − ν1,k
Nηk
p˜k
ηk
This inequality holds by the assumptions of our construction:
p˜1
η1
− p˜k
ηk
≥ ν˜1,1
η1︸︷︷︸
≤1
p˜1
η1
− ν˜1,k
ηk︸︷︷︸
≥1
p˜1
η1
p˜k
ηk
=⇒ p˜1
η1
− p˜k
ηk
>
1
N
(
ν˜1,1
η1
p˜1
η1
− ν˜1,k
ηk
p˜k
ηk
)
(b) Suppose the IAM’s distribution of tickets is proportional to p˜, so that p˜1
η1
= p˜2
η2
= · · · = p˜K
ηK
,
but two players are not playing the same strategy. At least one player has a profitable
deviation.
Suppose player 1’s allocation differs from the IAM odds. Let ν1,1 = η1 − ξ, ν1,2 = η2 + ξ,
and consider the gains and losses to player 1 from shifting  = ξ/N tickets from bucket 2 to
bucket 1.
Gains from Increasing ν1,1:
Nη1−ν1,1
Nη1+

N
Cost of Decreasing ν1,2:
Nη2−ν1,2
Nη2−

N
We will show this deviation is profitable by verifying that:
Nη1 − ν1,1
Nη1 + 
>
Nη2 − ν1,2
Nη2 − 
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This inequality can be established by direct substitution:
Nη1−ν1,1
Nη1+
= (N−1)η1+ξ
Nη1+ξ/N
; Nη2−ν1,2
Nη2− =
(N−1)η2−ξ
Nη1−ξ/N
Then:
(N − 1) η1 + ξ
(N − 1) η2 − ξ >
Nη1 + ξ
Nη2 − ξ >
Nη1 + ξ/N
Nη2 − ξ/N =⇒
Nη1 − ν1,1
Nη1 + 
>
(N − 1) η2 − ξ
Nη1 − ξ/N
Part 3: Information Aggregation Properties
By the agreement assumption and the results of Parts (1) and (2), the IAM ticket allocation
represents rational expectations for E [pi|s1, . . . , sN , α]. Clearly, if every player places tickets
proportionally to p˜, then the aggregated distribution of tickets in the IAM will match this
distribution. If information accumulates with either a large number of players or with players’
signal counts, so that a Law of Large Numbers applies, the IAM would aggregate information
exactly.
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B Forecast Evaluation for Other Predictive Measures
from the IAM
This appendix replicates the forecast evaluation results from the main body of the paper
using the Median and Mode from the IAM in place of the Mean of the IAM’s Distribution.
Table B.1: Summary Statistics for Forecast Data
This table presents summary statistics characterizing the average and standard deviation of unit sales, the
target variable to be forecast, and the Median and the Mode of the IAM Distribution. The columns report
results broken down by the forecast horizon at which forecasts are generated and the channel through
which the sales were delivered.
Full Forecast Horizon Sales Channel
Sample Last Mth 1-3 Mth 4-6 Mth 7-9 Mth Indirect Direct
First Period 200602 200602 200602 200603 200604 200604 200602
Last Period 201303 201303 201303 201303 201303 201104 201303
Num of Obs 979 113 339 328 312 339 640
Num of Qtrs 30 30 30 29 28 21 30
Average Sales 1.00 0.97 0.97 1.00 1.03 1.00 1.00
Std Dev Sales 1.00 1.02 1.01 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.00
Average Median 1.16 0.96 1.01 1.16 1.34 1.11 1.19
Std Dev Median 1.01 1.02 1.00 1.01 0.98 0.86 1.08
Median RMSE 0.88 0.27 0.55 0.89 1.12 1.08 0.75
Average IAM Mode 1.15 0.97 1.01 1.13 1.33 1.09 1.18
Std Dev IAM Mode 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 0.98 0.88 1.07
IAM Mode RMSE 0.89 0.29 0.57 0.89 1.13 1.10 0.75
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Table B.2: Comparing Forecast Loss Across Mechanisms
This table presents Diebold-Mariano tests comparing the point forecasts from the official forecast and the
median and mode information aggregation mechanism forecast. The Root Mean ∆ Square Error reports
the square root of the absolute average difference in the square error for the official and IAM forecasts,
signed negatively for cases where the official forecast outperforms the IAM. The Outperformance
Frequency captures the frequency with which the IAM forecast was more accurate than the official
forecast. The DM-Statistic and p-Value report the Diebold-Mariano test statistic and p-Value using
three-way clustered standard errors by product, period, and horizon.
Panel A: Median IAM Forecast
Num of Freq IAM Avg Abs ∆ Diebold-Mariano Test
Obs Outperforms Loss(*100) t-Statistic p-Value
Full Sample 979 60% 16.86 (2.53) 1.2%
Forecast Horizon
1 Mth 113 67% 6.71 (2.46) 1.6%
2-3 Mths 226 58% 15.24 (1.88) 6.1%
4-6 Mths 328 58% 15.77 (2.29) 2.2%
7-9 Mths 312 61% 22.84 (2.40) 1.7%
Sales Channel
Indirect 339 56% 27.86 (2.27) 2.4%
Direct 640 63% 11.02 (3.62) 0%
Panel B: Mode IAM Forecast
Num of Freq IAM Avg Abs ∆ Diebold-Mariano Test
Obs Outperforms Loss(*100) t-Statistic p-Value
Full Sample 979 59% 15.32 (2.42) 1.6%
Forecast Horizon
1 Mth 113 61% 5.50 (2.28) 2.4%
2-3 Mths 226 59% 12.88 (1.65) 10%
4-6 Mths 328 58% 15.64 (2.26) 2.4%
7-9 Mths 312 59% 20.31 (1.87) 6.2%
Sales Channel
Indirect 339 52% 24.69 (1.97) 4.9%
Direct 640 63% 10.36 (5.25) 0%
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Table B.3: Forecast Combination Regressions
This table presents estimates from the forecast combination regressions. Panel A uses the full sample of all
forecasts and horizons, with Panels B and C reporting results for horizon and product subsamples. The
test F(0, 1, 0) tests the hypothesis that α = 0, ωIAM = 1, and ωOfficial = 0, similarly, F(0, 0, 1) tests α = 0,
ωIAM = 0, and ωOfficial = 1. The tests F(., 0, 1) and F(., 0, 1) test the analogous restrictions without the
zero-intercept restriction. All tests use three-way clustered standard errors by product, period, and horizon.
Panel A: IAM Median Forecast
IAM Median Official
Intercept Weight Fcst Weight F(., 1, 0) F(., 0, 1) F(0, 1, 0) F(0, 0, 1)
Full Sample 0.30 106% -43% F-Stat 4.05 43.40 5.86 58.02
Std. Error (0.14) (14%) (14%) p-Value 0.7% 0% 0.3% 0%
Forecast Horizon
1 Month 0.07 114% -18% F-Stat 2.91 47.78 3.96 66.33
Std. Error (0.06) (16%) (14%) p-Value 3.8% 0% 2.2% 0%
2-3 Months 0.15 122% -41% F-Stat 3.58 28.95 4.73 38.04
Std. Error (0.08) (16%) (16%) p-Value 1.5% 0% 1% 0%
4-6 Month 0.32 90% -29% F-Stat 3.25 7.54 4.87 11.29
Std. Error (0.13) (25%) (28%) p-Value 2.2% 0% 0.8% 0%
7-9 Month 0.53 98% -58% F-Stat 4.35 12.70 5.79 18.21
Std. Error (0.24) (31%) (28%) p-Value 0.5% 0% 0.3% 0%
Sales Channel
Indirect 0.65 93% -56% F-Stat 5.50 21.23 7.59 30.75
Std. Error (0.22) (23%) (20%) p-Value 0.1% 0% 0.1% 0%
Direct 0.16 111% -40% F-Stat 3.17 36.24 4.60 46.46
Std. Error (0.1) (17%) (15%) p-Value 2.4% 0% 1% 0%
Panel B: IAM Mode Forecast
IAM Mode Official
Intercept Weight Fcst Weight F(., 1, 0) F(., 0, 1) F(0, 1, 0) F(0, 0, 1)
Full Sample 0.30 72% -11% F-Stat 2.66 17.98 3.93 26.93
Std. Error (0.15) (14%) (15%) p-Value 4.7% 0% 2% 0%
Forecast Horizon
1 Month 0.04 95% 1% F-Stat 0.31 52.63 0.44 67.17
Std. Error (0.06) (9%) (9%) p-Value 81.6% 0% 64.6% 0%
2-3 Months 0.17 96% -17% F-Stat 2.28 19.32 3.38 25.69
Std. Error (0.09) (20%) (17%) p-Value 8.1% 0% 3.6% 0%
4-6 Month 0.33 68% -7% F-Stat 3.99 6.39 5.95 9.45
Std. Error (0.14) (21%) (25%) p-Value 0.8% 0% 0.3% 0%
7-9 Month 0.53 50% -12% F-Stat 3.95 7.51 5.15 9.75
Std. Error (0.24) (27%) (27%) p-Value 0.9% 0% 0.6% 0%
Sales Channel
Indirect 0.67 69% -34% F-Stat 4.90 19.46 6.76 27.60
Std. Error (0.23) (21%) (18%) p-Value 0.2% 0% 0.1% 0%
Direct 0.17 70% 1% F-Stat 1.81 27.46 2.21 40.75
Std. Error (0.12) (16%) (11%) p-Value 14.3% 0% 11% 0%
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Procedure 
Step 1: Register 
Register yourself in the system database.  If you are not in the database the system 
will force you to register when you try to log into the Real Deal. 
 
Go to (at any time including now) http://xxxx.caltech.edu/xxx 
Select “Sign up as a new user”.  Choose an ID, a password, and enter a number into 
the “SS Number” field.  We are not using real social security numbers – just pick a 
number with 9 digits that you can remember (or write down).  Part of a phone 
number might be a good idea. 
 
Everyone should enter the following information.  It will not be used for anything 
but is required in the stock application we are using. 
 
University = “Company A” and Class = “Company A” 
Street = “123 Main Street” City = “Anytown” 
State = “CA”  Zip = “12345” Country = “USA” 
Enter your real e-mail address and phone number.  (Enter area code “123” and 
then your real seven digit Intel phone number.) 
 
Step 2: Practice 
Go to the practice page http://xxxx.caltech.edu/Sales-practice/ prior to the Real Deal 
to become familiar with the forecasting application.  Buy tickets for a few different 
forecasts and observe how the application responds. 
 
Step 3: Get your secure ID 
On the day of the Real Deal, ideally a few minutes before the start time, go to the 
Real Deal location, http://xxxxcaltech.edu/BusinessUnitYearQ#Date/.  It will ask 
you for the user name and password that you used in Step 1.  It will then give you 
your secure ID, which disguises your identity.  Click the “Login” button to enter the 
Real Deal.  You will not be able to use the application until the session begins. 
 
Step 4: Participate in the Real Deal 
The session will be held on November 7 at 4:00 PM Pacific Time.  Be on time – a few 
minutes early would be wise.   The trial will start exactly on time, allowing for clock 
differences, and move very quickly.  It will likely be over in 30 minutes even though 
it will remain open for an hour. 
 
Panics or problems: e-mail or call Mister X at ###-###-####.  He will be working 
with Caltech to manage the trial and solve any problems. 
 
We will put general announcements (if needed) on the Real Deal screens. 
 
C Experimental Instructions
C.1
Determining Winners 
Four prizes will be awarded for each of the three quarters forecast 
during the trial – see details below.  We will know which forecast is 
correct once actual Q4 2006 and Q1, Q2 2007 Business Unit Billings are 
available.  Prizes for each quarter will be awarded after the close of that 
quarter.  All tickets in the correct forecast are considered winning 
tickets and will be entered into a drawing for prizes.  After each prize 
drawing the winning ticket will be put back in the hopper, so each ticket 
may win more than one prize. 
 
Q4 2006 
Drawing 1: $100 
Drawing 2: $100 
Drawing 3: $50 
Drawing 4: $50 
Q1 2007 
Drawing 1: $100 
Drawing 2: $100 
Drawing 3: $50 
Drawing 4: $50 
Q2 2007 
Drawing 1: $100 
Drawing 2: $100 
Drawing 3: $50 
Drawing 4: $50 
 
These prizes will be distributed as an employee recognition award in the 
near term.  Alternative payment methods may be developed in the long 
term. 
 
 
Privacy 
Participants will remain completely anonymous except to the research 
team at Caltech and to Mister X, the research manager at Company A.  
No one else participating in the trial will know for certain who is 
participating, so they certainly will not know which forecasts you 
choose.  The final forecast generated by all participants will be 
published, but your personal forecast will be held in confidence by the 
research team.  We will award prizes to the winners, but even the 
winners will not be announced. 
 
We expect that participants will not share information with one another 
before, during or after the trial.  Past research has shown that the best 
results are achieved when participants do not share information. 
 
C.2
